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HABITABILITY IN SLUM LEASES
The position of the slum tenant is indeed an unenviable one.
He is governed by archaic property laws dating from feudal
England which are heavily weighted in the landlord's favor
and hinder efforts at slum rehabilitation. The slum tenant does
not bargain with his landlord, for he cannot meet the landlord
on anything approximating equal terms. Without bargaining
strength he must accept the landlord's offer as to duration, price,
and services. Because of the current housing shortage and his
poor economic position, he is often forced to accept premises at
the commencement of a tenancy in a condition falling short of
habitability. The same housing shortage curtails the indigent
tenant's freedom to move when his premises become uninhabitable
due to landlord neglect during the tenancy. In addition, pres-
suring the landlord to improve them often results in retaliatory
action against the tenant, usually eviction.
I. Co~jioN LAW DEVEW0MENT
By the fifteenth century the lessee had acquired the in rem
right to recover possession of the leased land from the lessor
or third party interlopers. The lease was then considered mainly
a conveyance, giving the lessee possessory rights good against
the world, rather than only contractual rights against the lessor.
Lessees in that day were generally engaged in agriculture,
making the land, rather than the buildings, of primary im-
portance. The land was "sold" for a term, without any warranty
of fitness, and the buildings, ancillary to the land, were trans-
ferred in the same way, without any warranty of habitability or
fitness. The theory sprang from the lessee's being able to see
the premises for himself, along with his ability to make any
necessary repairs if he decided to accept the lease. There was
"no law against renting a tumbledown house,"' any more than
there was a prohibition against selling one. Without a covenant
to repair, the lessor was not bound to do so during the term. The
fact that the lessor voluntarily made some repairs created no
duty on his part to make others.2 Even if the lessor did promise
to make repairs, his failure to perform did not excuse the lessee
1. 1 H. TiFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 86, at 557 (1910), citing Erle,
C. J., in Robbins v. Jones, 15 C.B. 221, 240 (N.J. 1863).
2. 3A G. THomPsoN, REAL PRoPRTY § 1230, at 133 (repl. 1959).
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from his obligation to pay rent. An exception to this caveat
emptor theory of leases was the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
which was implied from the mere relation of landlord and ten-
ant, without regard to whether the lease was oral or written.4
The view that the lease was a sale of a term may have been
sound before the nineteenth century, for leases then were pri-
marily of agricultural land. The lessee could work the land at
a profit even though the buildings were uninhabitable, and,
being in possession of the entire building, could make repairs
without venturing from areas he possessed. However, such a
view is highly inadequate to protect the interest of today's
urban slum tenant who, if he lacks habitable rooms and service-
able heating and plumbing, has little or nothing. In addition,
the ability of the tenant to repair is limited by the size of the
leased area (very small in slum apartments) and even by
statute.5
Some nineteenth and twentieth century courts and legislatures
have realized that changing social and economic conditions re-
quire changes in the legal structure of the landlord-tenant re-
lationship.
II. ImxPLmD DuTY To REPAm
The overwhelming majority view today is in accordance with
the common law position that no obligation to repair is placed
upon the landlord, unless by force of an express covenant to
do so.6 The rule operates even though the premises become dan-
gerous or untenantable7
Several jurisdictions have cut inroads into the harshness of
this position through statutory enactment. Louisiana requires
3. The theory was that the rent continued to issue from the lessee's right to
possession of the land. 7 W. HOLDSWoRTE, HISTORY OF ENGLISn LAW 267
(1926).
4. It flowed "as a natural consequence from the original character of a
demise for years, as being not a conveyance but merely a covenant that the
lessee should enjoy the land, a breach of which entitled him to the recovery
of damages;" 1 H. TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT § 79, at 518 (1910).
5. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-70 (1962), requiring the tenant to obtain
written permission from his landlord before making "alterations" under pain
of forfeiting the residue of the lease.
6. 3A G. T~omPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1230, at 132 (repl. 1959). The most
recent reiterations of the doctrine may be found in: Stover v. Fechtman, 222
N.E.2d 281 (Ind. App. 1966); Goldstein v. Corrigan, 405 S.W.2d 425 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1966). Payton v. Rowland, 208 Va. 24, 155 S.E2d 36 (1967).
7. See, e.g., Mallard v. Duke, 131 S.C. 175, 189, 126 S.E. 525, 530 (1924),
in which the court appeared to rely on the tenant's knowing of the condi-
tion of the premises before entering into the lease.
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the landlord to maintain the leased premises in good condition.8
Georgia has expressly rejected the common law position in
favor of the affirmative duty imposed by the civil law.9 Cali-
fornia requires the lessor of a building intended for human
occupancy to put it in a condition fit for such occupation and
to repair subsequent dilapidations. 1 The identical statutes of
Oklahoma 1 and South Dakota' 2 are similar in form to that of
California.13 New York imposes this duty upon owners of
multiple dwellings.14
South Carolina imposes no implied duty to repair upon the
landlord. The most recent statement to that effect is in Connor
v. Farmers & Merchants Bank,15 a tort action for personal
injuries caused by the landlord's negligent repairing. Dictum
in the opinion affirmed the lack of legal duty on the part of
the landlord to keep the leased premises in repair, in the absence
of an express covenant or contract to do so.16 This rule, however,
has been well settled in this state for many years.
17
III. IBmP WARRANTr OF FrNss
Although the concept of implied warranty of fitness has seen
much use in other areas in this century, its application in the
realm of landlord and tenant differs very little from the com-
mon law. Generally, there is no obligation on the part of the
landlord to see that the premises are, at the time of the demise,
in a condition of fitness for the use which the tenant proposes,
whether that be business or residence.18 A tenant, like the pur-
8. LA. REv. STAT. §§ 2692-3(1870). It should be noted that this statute
is based upon civil law which placed this duty on the lessor.
9. GA CODE ANN. § 61-111 (1966). Upon failure of the landlord to per-
form, the tenant has been allowed to repair himself and set off reasonable
expenses against the rent. Daugherty v. Taylor, 5 Ga. App. 773, 63 S.E.
928 (1909).
10. CAL. CiV. CoDE §§ 1941-42 (West 1957), allowing the tenant, after
notice and failure of the landlord to repair, to repair and deduct the expense,
up to one month's rent, from the rent.
11. OKLA. STAT. tit 41, §§ 31, 32 (1961).
12. S.D. CODE §§38.0409-10 (1939).
13. South Dakota and Oklahoma, however, place no limit on the expense
in repairing which the tenant may deduct from the rent.
14. N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 78 (McKinney 1946).
15. 243 S.C. 132, 132 S.E.2d 385 (1963).
16. Id. at 139, 132 S.E.2d at 388.
17. Sec, e.g.,Williams v. Salmond, 79 S.C. 459, 61 S.E. 79 (1907) ; Reardon
v. Averbuck, 92 S.C. 569, 75 S.E. 959 (1912); Cantrell v. Fowler, 32 S.C.
589, 10 S.E. 934 (1889).
18. 3A G. THomPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1230, at 129 (repl. 1959).
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chaser of a thing already in existence, is presumed to take only
after examination. If he desires to protect himself in this regard
he must exact from the landlord an express stipulation as to the
condition of the premises.19
Most implied warranties in leases which exist today have
been derived from legislation, generally of the type imposing
a duty to repair noted supra. For example, Georgia has con-
strued its repair statute20 to imply a warranty that the premises
are in good repair at the time they are leased.21 California has
derived an implied warranty of habitability through construc-
tion of a similar statute.
22
There is one case law exception to this general rule. A ma-
jority of jurisdictions have imposed a warranty of fitness for
furnished premises let for a short term.28 This exception will
not be explored in depth here, as this type of situation is en-
countered rarely, if ever, in the problem areas with which this
paper is concerned. However, in 1981 the Minnesota court ex-
tended this exception to leases of multiple apartment buildings,
without the aid of statutory enactment.24 As explained, the
common law theory operated on the supposition that the tenant
would accept the premises and adapt them to his intended use.
The court refuted this reasoning by declaring that the tenant
in a multiple apartment building had insufficient control over
his premises to adapt them. The tenant's remedy, as stipulated
here, was to vacate, not to repair and deduct.
2 5
Perhaps an even more impressive judicial landmark is Pines
v. Perssion.26 Here the Wisconsin court liberally construed a
statute27 allowing the tenant to vacate if the premises became
untenantable by reason of the elements or any other cause. The
court analyzed the situation:
19. Id. Cf. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-315 (Supp. 1966), warranty of fitness
for particular purpose.
20. GA. CODE ANN. § 61-111 (1966).
21. Wilson v. Elijah A. Brown Co., 62 Ga. App. 898, 10 S.E2d 219 (1940).
22. Buckner v. Azulai, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967). The court pointed out to
follow the rule of no implied warranty of habitability would be inconsistent
with legislative policy concerning housing standards.
23. 3A G. THoMPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1230, at 136 (repl. 1959).
24. Delamater v. Foreman, 184 Minn. 428, 239 N.W. 148 (1931).
25. Id. at 429, 239 N.W. at 149.
26. 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961).
27. Wis. STAT. § 234.17 (1965). This statute, in accord with most of the
others already mentioned, states its non-applicability if the condition was
brought about through fault or neglect of the tenant.
1968] NOTEs
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss2/5
SOUTH CAROLIA LAW REViEW
Legislation and administrative rules, such as the safeplace
statute, building codes and health regulations, all impose
certain duties on a property owner with respect to the
condition of his premises. Thus the legislature has made
a policy judgment-that it is socially desirable to impose
these duties on a property owner-which has rendered the
old common law rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of
no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our
opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy
concerning housing standards. The need and social desira-
bility of adequate housing for people in this era of rapid
population increases is too important to be rebuffed by that
obnoxious legal cliche, caveat emptor. Permitting landlords
to rent "tumbledown" houses is at least a contributing
cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency
and high property taxes for conscientious landowners.
28
Thus the Wisconsin court imposed an implied warranty of
habitability which apparently applies to all leases of dwellings.
The tenant in the instant case was allowed to vacate. Whether
a remedy allowing the tenant to remain in possession (a much
more meaningful solution for today's slum tenant) could be de-
rived is open to speculation.
As do most jurisdictions, South Carolina follows the rule of
caveat emptor, with no implied warranty of fitness or habitabil-
ity. "The lessor turns over the property and the lessee takes
it as it is turned over to him."20 In addition, legislation in
this state denies the tenant the right to alter the leased premises
without written permission from the landlord.30 It could be
argued that this statute negates the element of tenant control
over the premises required for the majority rationale.31
One judicial precedent in this state presents a possible ap-
proach. In Coogan v. Parker,32 the court stated the following
doctrine: "[W]here there is a substantial destruction of the
subject-matter, out of which rent is reserved . . . by an act
of God or of public enemies, the tenant may elect to rescind, and
28. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961).
29. Williams v. Salmond, 79 S.C. 459, 460, 61 S.E. 79 (1907).
30. S. C. CODE ANN. § 41-70 (1962).
31. But see Dubay v. Cambridge Housing Authority, 225 N.E2d 374 (Mass.
1967), in which a similar restriction was held not to give the landlord suffi-
cient control over the premises to impose an implied duty to repair.
32. 2 S. C. 255 (1871).
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NoTEs
on surrendering all benefit thereunder be discharged from the
payment of rent."33 The similarity between this statement and
the Wisconsin statute,34 construed so liberally in Pines, is readily
apparent. A fortiori, the reasoning of the Pines court could
be followed toward deriving an implied warranty. Several prob-
lems are apparent. First, no legislation in this area has been
passed in South Carolina, and most courts seem to feel the
legislature must make the initial advancement;35 second, the
doctrine is limited to destruction by God or public enemies.
However, Coogan might be used as a persuasive device, to sug-
gest that judicial precedent for reform exists.
IV. MuN Ic AL ITousInG ORDINANCES
A. History
In 1954, the South Carolina legislature (perhaps responding
to conditions required for federal housing funds) passed a bill"
granting authority to cities of 5,000 or more population to
enact municipal ordinances defining minimum housing stand-
ards.3 7 Columbia was one of the first cities to enact a housing
code under this legislative approval.38 Its requirements have
been upheld as a valid and reasonable exercise of the police
power.3 9
B. Enforcement
Coercing private adherence to minimum housing standards
is a complex process. It requires an administrative procedure
efficient enough to detect violations and to prosecute individuals
who fail to comply and an effective system of remedies that
33. Id. at 259.
34. Wis. STAT. § 234.17 (1965).
35. See, e.g., Gustin v. Williams, 62 Cal. Rptr. 838, 840 (1967).
36. S. C. CODE AN. §§36-501 to 511 (1962).
37. Id. at § 36-503.
38. COLUMBIA, S. C., CODE §§ 7-27 to 38 (1957).
39. Richards v. Columbia, 227 S.C. 538, 88 S.E.2d 683 (1955). However,
several catch-all phrases in the ordinance were stricken as not containing a
"sufficiently definite standard." 227 S.C. at 555, 88 S.E.2d at 691. The court
did quote with approval from McNulty v. Owens, 188 S.C. 377, 199 S.E. 425
(1938): "[T]he conclusion is inescapable that bad housing conditions have an
adverse effect on the health and morals of the city of Columbia." 188 S.C. at
391, 199 S.E. at 431.
1968]
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can secure the correction of existing violations and deter new of-
fenses.
Ideally, housing codes should expressly prohibit the leasing
of any premises which fail to meet minimum standards, with
liability placed upon the landlord-owner. Unfortunately, few
of them include such a provision. The Columbia Housing Code
does not, although responsibility for repair under a commission
directive is placed upon the "owner."
40
The Columbia Housing Code provides that investigation of
code violations be handled by a rehabilitation director with "such
assistants as may be deemed necessary." 41 At present the staff
consists of three inspectors and three neighborhood workers.
The active case load being handled by this office as of March
1, 1968, totaled 691 cases. This staff-to-cases ratio seems to be
the rule with similar investigating agencies in other urban
areas.
42
The Columbia Housing Code is oriented about the complaint
inspection, although the rehabilitation director claims some area
inspection is done. Complaint-initiated inspections alone are
generally ineffective. First, they tend to focus only on the
alleged violations. Second, because many violations inevitably
go unreported, random enforcement results. This is particularly
unfortuante because low-income tenants are often unaware of or
do not avail themselves of enforcement services. Third, the un-
even enforcement pattern reduces incentive to voluntary com-
pliance. Nonetheless, a complaint system is essential; it provides
an outlet for aggrieved individuals, a significant source of viola-
tion information, and a procedure for securing prompt inspection
of particularly hazardous conditions.
In an area inspection program all dwellings in a designated
area are systematically inspected and every violation is recorded.
Area inspections seem the most effective way to discover all
violations and to gain information about the quality of a city's
housing inventory, in addition to retarding neighborhood de-
terioration. Detecting violations at earlier stages lowers repair
costs. Competitive advantages of operating buildings at lower
costs due to undetected violations is eliminated, and landlord
40. COLUMBIA, S.C., CODE § 7-32 (1957).
41. Id. at §7-29.
42. For example, in 1964 the Washington, D. C., Housing Division, with
35 inspectors, handled 10,313 cases.
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responsiveness is improved. Supplementing complaint inspec-
tion with an efficient area inspection appears essential.
48
The Columbia Housing Code provides that a complaint may
be filed with the rehabilitation director by "a public authority
or by at least five residents of the city."44 However, petitioning
the rehabilitation director does not necessarily benefit the in-
digent tenant. Under this state's thirty day notice statute,4G
a tenancy from month to month may be ended by either party.
No reason is required to gain an eviction order if this procedure
is followed. Obviously, a petitioning tenant is going to be sub-
ject to retaliatory eviction40 long before any real action is taken
on his petition.4 7 The landlord may decide to make minimum
repairs later and re-rent. Generally, any show of compliance
by the owner is sufficient to satisfy the rehabilitation director.
However, the average cost of repairing dwellings in this low-
rent class to meet minimum standards is $750.00, a fact which
encourages many slum landlords to let the premises lie idle.
48
The availability of low-rent housing in Columbia will not
encourage any indigent tenant to risk losing his shelter. The
$20.00-$31.50 per month housing units are constantly filled, ac-
cording to the Columbia Rehabilitation Director. In addition,
over seven hundred applicants are currently on the waiting list
for public housing in Columbia.
43. Perhaps an even more serious problem is the time required to attain
satisfactory rehabilitation or, in the alternative, to impose a penalty for non-
compliance with a housing office directive. A conservative estimate of the
period necessary to close a case, assuming the landlord utilizes all the avenues
of delay available to him under normal housing code procedure, is seven
months. The likelihood of court action is almost non-existent. The Columbia
Rehabilitation Director could cite only eight occasions on which his office has
carried a case to court, over approximately 6 years.
44. COLuMBiA, S. C., CODE § 7-31 (1957). The Columbia Rehabilitation
Director includes the local Legal Aid Service Agency under the "Public
Authority" heading. In addition, his office will allow a petition to be filed by
an individual tenant.
45. S. C. CODE AN. § 41-63 (1962).
46. Discussed in detail, at p. 295.
47. In fact, some Columbia landlords have been able to rid themselves of
complaining tenants without even going through the eviction procedure. They
use the following method: while the rehabilitation director has no power to
demolish, he does have the authority to vacate a building when the owner re-
fuses to comply; therefore, when the owner is served with a repair, vacate, or
demolish order, he does nothing. The rehabilitation director then vacates the
premises, in effect evicting the complaining tenant.
48. Because of the time lapse between detection of a violation and final
disposition of the case, many owners refrain from compliance for months.
Generally, they are not penalized for delaying and any penalty imposed is sus-
pended upon eventual compliance. Obviously, a more streamlined procedure
is needed. See Gribetz & Grad, Housing Code Enforcement: Sanctions and
Remedies, 66 CoLUM. L. REv. 1254 (1966).
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0. Impyied Warranty Based Upon Coumbia Housing Code
Although no section of the ordinance explicitly prohibits the
leasing of dwellings which fail to comply with the minimum
standards set forth,49 it may still be argued that the legislature"
and municipality have imposed certain duties upon the property
owner which have rendered the common law rule of caveat
emptor obsolete. To follow the old rule of no implied warranty
of habitability would be inconsistent with the current policy
underlying housing standards, i.e., the need and social desirabil-
ity of adequate housing for people, the quenching of urban
blight, etc.51 Therefore it may be contended that a contractual
obligation is imposed upon the landlord by way of an implied
covenant that the premises meet the minimum requirements of
the Code.52 It should be noted that no express or exclusive
remedy is made available to any individual in the Code itself.
Timmons v. Wood Products Corp.,53 one of the leading land-
lord and tenant cases in South Carolina, held that no liability
existed on the part of the landlord for personal injuries to his
tenant caused by a defect in the premises, with six exceptions.
One of those enumerated is when the landlord breaches a statu-
tory duty.54 The Columbia Housing Code, authorized by the
legislature and approved by the courts, may constitute such a
statute. However, Timmons may have been referring only to
statutes which give the tenant an express cause of action.
Freedom of contract is a particularly sacred concept to many
courts. Very adhesive "bargains" are usually required to force
judicial invasion into this area. The transaction in which a
tenant, lacking any bargaining power because of a housing
shortage, is forced to accept premises in a rundown condition
smacks strongly of adhesion. Freedom of contract has been lim-
ited in other areas in which public policy required that adhesive
abuse be eliminated. For example, a borrower may not contract
49.CoLuMBIA, S. C., CODE § 7-35 (1957).
50. S. C. CODE ANN. § 36-503 (1962), authorizing enactment of the housing
ordinances, and § 36-505, suggesting minimum standards.
51. See COLUMBrA, S. C., CODE § 7-26 (1957), in which the conditions with
which the ordinance is concerned are described as "dangerous or detrimental to
the health, safety or morals or .. . inimical to the welfare of the residents
of the city."
52. This approach has been used with success in the District of Columbia.
See Whetzel v. Jeff Fisher Management Co., 282 F.2d 443 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
53. 164 S.C. 361, 162 S.E. 329 (1932).
54. Id. at 374, 162 S.E. at 333.
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away the defense of usury.55 Waiver by an employee of a
statutory minimum wage is not permitted.5 6 If the warranty
suggested herein is implied, the tenant's occupying the premises
and paying the rent should not be construed a waiver of any
breach of the warranty.
If an implied warranty of habitability or fitness or an implied
duty to repair can be established, there remains the matter of
remedies for their breach. The tenant would probably be allowed
to abandon the premises without further liability for rent (in
effect rescinding the lease) but abandonment is not usually the
relief desired by the slum tenant because the housing shortage
effectively curtails his freedom of movement. Allowing the
tenant to remain in possession of the defective premises, continue
paying the rent, and sue for damages would be a meaningful
remedy. The damages might be the cost of repairing the dwell-
ing to meet the minimum standards of the housing code. This
question should be considered in the light of Timmn8:
[I]f the premises become dangerous to life or limb, the
tenant, rather than expose himself and the members of his
houshold to such dangers, may, upon failure of the lessor to
perform his engagement to repair, (1) rescind the contract
and abandon the premises; (2) make the repairs himself
and deduct the expense thereof from the rent, or recover
the same upon a counterclaim in an action for rent . . .
(3) occupy without repair, and recoup such damages as
are ordinarily incident to a breach of contract by counter-
claim in the landlord's action for rent . . . or (4) sue for
damages for breach of contract.
5 7
These remedies are for breach of an express covenant to repair,
but arguably they would apply for breach of an implied cove-
nant to repair or implied warranty of fitness or habitability.
V. COVENANT OF QuIET ENJOYMENT
As early as the fifteenth century it was recognized that the
relation of landlord and tenant gave rise to the implied covenant
of quiet enjoyment. 58 The legal implication of the covenant is
55. 6A A. CopaiN, CONTRACTs § 1515, at 731 (1962).
56. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697 (1945). See also the un-
conscionability theory of the Uniform Commercial Code. S. C. CODE ANN.
§ 10.2-302 (Supp. 1966).
57. Timmons v. Wood Prods. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 367, 162 S.E. 329, 331
(1932).
58. 7 W. HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY oF ENGusH LAw 251 (1926).
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that the landlord has an adequate title to the estate created by
the lease and that he will permit the tenant to enjoy, without
disturbance or interruption, the interest, title, and privilege de-
mised, subject to all such rights as are expressly or by natural
implication reserved to the lessor.59 The covenant is implied
from the landlord-tenant relationship in the majority of juris-
dictions today.60 No cases concerning covenants for title in
leases have ever arisen in South Carolina. However, it may be
assumed with some assurance that the majority view will be
followed and this covenant implied, whether the lease be oral
or written.
An actual eviction of the tenant by the landlord or anyone
else with paramount title is a breach of the covenant. Actual
evictions are rarely encountered in the indigent tenant situation,
except where the landlord is given a statutory right to evict, as
when the tenant refuses to pay rent.01
The early cases involved an actual physical ouster 62 but
eventually it became obvious that the landlord could make the
tenant's position so untenable that he would be forced to
abandon the premises and that, in such a situation, the tenant
should have the same remedies as for actual eviction. An act
by the landlord which esssentially deprives the tenant of bene-
ficial use or enjoyment of a part or of the whole of the premises
is a constructive eviction.68 Yet herein lies the stumbling block
for the indigent tenant. There can be no constructive eviction,
under the majority view today, unless the tenant surrenders or
abandons the premises within a reasonable time after the
landlord's acts. 6 4 As noted, abandonment is not the remedy de-
sired by the slum tenant.
Two reasons have generally been given for requiring abandon-
ment in constructive eviction situations. First, the basis of con-
structive eviction is the untenantable or uninhabitable condition
of the premises. Therefore, it is reasoned that, if the premises
are uninhabitable, the tenant would not remain in possession,
and his remaining in possession belies any claim of uninhabitabil-
ity. This line of reasoning may be refuted by showing a housing
59. 3 G. THiOMPS0N, REAL PROPERTY § 1129, at 471 (repl. 1959).
60. Id. at 468.
61. See, e.g., S.C. CoDE ANN. § 41-65 (1962).
62. See, e.g., Avery v. Dougherty, 102 Ind. 443, 2 N.E. 123 (1885).
63. 3 G. THotPsoN, REAL PROPERTY § 1132, at 492 (repl. 1959).
64. Id.
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shortage to be the reason for the tenant's unwillingness to aban-
don. This approach has been used successfully in New York,
where the court took judicial notice of the housing shortage
and allowed the defense of constructive eviction, without aban-
donment, to an action for rent.65 Information from the Columbia
Urban Rehabilitation Director suggests than an equal shortage
of low-rent housing exists in Columbia.
The second reason for requiring abandonment is more difficult
to circumvent. It is felt that the tenant should not be able
to avoid payment of the rent reserved while retaining possession
under the lease. For this reason, constructive eviction without
abandonment is generally unsuccessful as a defense to an action
for rent.66
As mentioned, no cases involving covenants for title in leases
have ever arisen in South Carolina. Therefore, constructive
eviction has never been considered. However, several rules in-
volving the covenant of quiet enjoyment as it applies to general
conveyances of realty have been laid down. One of the leading
cases is Jeter v. Glenn,67 in which it was noted that "[o]f a cove-
nant of quiet enjoyment, there is no breach before eviction or
its equivakent."68 This language, along with a dearth of cases
involving this covenant in leases, might provide an opening for
judicial inroads into this area.
The extent or character of the interference with enjoyment
necesary to constitute a breach of the covenant is a question on
which the cases do not present any harmonious rule. It has been
said that the landlord, without being guilty of an actual physical
disturbance of the tenant's possession, may so interfere with
his enjoyment as to be liable in damages." There would seem
to be no reason, then, why any interference by the landlord
with the tenant's right to enjoyment should not be considered a
breach of the covenant, without regard to whether the tenant
is thereby physically dispossessed or compelled to move. There-
fore, when the premises are in a state of disrepair not sufficient
for constructive eviction, the tenant should still be able to
65. Majen Realty Co. v. Glotzer, 61 N.Y.S2d 195 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1946).
66. See, e.g., Ackerhalt v. Smith, 141 A2d 187 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1958);
Key v. Swanson, 113 Okla. 287, 241 P. 490 (1925); Angelo v. Deutser, 30
S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
67. 9 Rich. L. 374 (S.C. 1856).
68. Id. at 378 (emphasis added).
69. Keating v. Springer, 146 Ill. 481, 34 N.E. 805 (1893); Boyer v. Com-
mercial Bldg. Inv. Co., 110 Iowa 491, 81 N.W. 720 (1900).
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bring an action for breach of the covenant. There is a conflict
in the cases, but a substantial number have sanctioned recovery.
70
If it be assumed that any interference by the landlord is a
breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment for which the land-
lord must respond in damages, it does not follow that the tenant
may treat any such act as terminating the lease and relieving
him of the duty to pay rent. For this an eviction, either actual
or constructive, is necessary. Convenants in a lease are regarded
as independent; i.e., breaching the covenant of quiet enjoyment
does not relieve the tenant of the covenant to pay rent.7 1 The
rule that eviction is a defense to rent really operates as an
exception to this rule.7 2 These lesser breaches of the covenant,
however, should give the tenant an independent cause of action.
Non-compliance with any of the minimum standards of the
Columbia Housing Code, although not reaching an untenantable
condition, would constitute such a minor breach of the covenant.
Thus obstacles in the way of a plea of constructive eviction could
be circumvented and the desired result reached by seeking af-
firmative relief for interference with enjoyment.73 Of course,
these lesser interferences might also be used a recoupment,'74
set-off, or counterclaiM7 5 in an action by the landlord for rent.
If the tenant remains in possession the measure of damages
would be the difference between the value of the use of the
property with and without the interference. When interposed
as a recoupment, set-off or counterclaim to an action for rent,
the rent claimed can be reduced by the amount of damages
sustained by the interference, which might be the difference
in rental value of the premises in repair and in disrepair or,
alternatively, the cost of repairs.76
Most cases supporting the proposition that interference with
possession and enjoyment is actionable involve positive acts of
interference by the landlord.77 But there appears to be no
70. See Metropole Const. Co. v. Hartigan, 83 NJ.L. 409, 85 A. 313, 315
(1912). See also 1 AMEmRCAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.50, at 278 (A. J. Casner
ed. 1952).
71. AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.50, at 279 (AJ. Casner ed. 1952).
72. Id.
73. See Boyer v. Commercial Bldg. Inv. Co., 110 Iowa 491, 81 N.W. 720
(1900).
74. Keating v. Springer, 146 Ill. 481, 34 N.E. 805 (1893), cf. Williamson
v. May, 44 Ga. App. 532, 162 S.E. 16Z (1932).
75. Cf. Timmons v. Wood Produs. Corp., 164 S.C. 361, 367, 162 S.E. 329,
331 (1932).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Keating v. Springer, 146 IlL 481, 24 N.E. 805 (1893).
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reason why failures, omissions, and neglect should not also give
rise to an action for breach of the covenant. Therefore, in a
jurisdiction which imposes the duty of repair or maintenance
upon the landlord by statute or ordinance, the landlord's failure
to repair or to meet minimum standards of habitability should
constitute a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment.
VI. R~rALiAToRy EvICToN
A tenant who attempts to better his housing conditions by
affirmative court action or by seeking enforcement of local
housing regulations may find himself the object of retaliatory
action by his landlord. The most frequently used weapon of
the landlord in retaliation is eviction.
The eviction procedure may also be utilized to render moot
an appeal on a novel defense by the tenant in an action for
possession or rent, or perhaps on a cause of action of first
impression.75 Usually the period necessary to terminate the
tenancy after notice will have passed before any appeal is
heard7 9 and, probably, even before the action is scheduled for
its original hearing.8 0 The landlord will then be entitled to
possession. This is a particularly effective means of preventing
the abrogation of outdated common law principles at the appel-
late level. One reason given supporting this system has been
that to restrain the landlord from taking legal means to regain
possession of leased premises to which he is entitled would be
an unwarranted deprivation of his property.8 '
In South Carolina most tenancies involving slum dwellers
are of the month to month variety. This type of tenancy may
be terminated by either party upon thirty days written notice.8 2
When this period has elapsed, the landlord may bring ejectment
proceedings against the tenant if he has not surrendered pos-
78. An example is a suit for damages for breach of an implied warranty of
habitability.
79. See note 43 supra.
80. The majority of slum tenancies in this country are classified as tenancies
from month to month. A few may be classified as tenancies at sufferance
(or at will). In either case, almost invariably only thirty days written notice
is required to terminate the tenancy (occasionally twenty days for tenancies
at will. S.C. CODE AxN. § 41-64 [1962]). No reason for termination under
this procedure is required.
81. Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for change,
54 Gao. L.J. 519, 542 (1966).
82. S. C. CODE ANN. § 41-63 (1962).
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session.8 3 The tenant may contest the ejectment, in which event
the magistrate having jurisdiction shall hear the case as any
other civil case, with similar procedures. 8 4 The tenant is pro-
vided with an action for damages against the landlord if he
is wrongfully dispossessed.8 5
The Columbia Housing Code does not give the tenant an
express right of action against the landlord to correct housing
violations. It cannot be doubted, however, that the tenant is
one of the persons whom the ordinance seeks to protect.8 8 The
tenant is, in a sense, given a remedy in that he is allowed to
petition the rehabilitation director.8 7 To insure the enforce-
ment of the ordinance, provisions for protecting the tenant from
reprisal for petitioning could be read into the Code. It would
seem that the public policy underlying enactment of the ordi-
nance would be utterly defeated by permitting landlords to in-
timidate petitioning tenants.
Several constitutional arguments might be used to deter retali-
ation by the landlord. The 1871 Civil Rights Act provides, in
part, for civil liability for any person who "under color of any
statute or regulation of any state subjects... any citizen ... to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws."88 In particular, the first amend-
ment allows no law which would abridge the right of the
people to petition the government "for a redress of grievances."8 9
This prohibition is applicable to the states,90 but a sufficient
nexus with governmental power has been required,91 which
would probably not include the private acts of the landlord.
However, judicial enforcement of private action has been found
sufficient as "state action."92 In addition, recent opinions of
the United States Supreme Court suggest that the fourteenth
amendment prohibitions may be extended to purely private
acts.
0 3
83. Id. at § 41-101.
84. Id. at § 41-106 to 112.
85. Id. at § 41-114.
86. See COLUMBIA, S. C., CoDE § 7-26 (1957).
87. COLUMBIA, S. C, CODE § 7-30 (1957), See also note 44 supra.
88. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 1, 17 Stat. 13.
89. U. S. Coxqsr. amend. I.
90. Id. at amend. XIV, § 1.
91. See, e.g., Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
92. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
93. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 782 (1966).
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Another constitutional avenue may be open to the tenant.
The Columbia Housing Code, in accordance with similar ordi-
nances, imposes criminal penalties for failure to comply with
directives of the rehabilitation director ordering compliance
with minimum standards.9 4 The tenant may have a constitutional
right to inform the city of non-compliance with minimum stand-
ards. The United States Supreme Court has said:
The right of a citizen informing of a violation of law,
like the right of a prisoner in custody upon a charge of
such violation, to be protected against lawless violence, does
not depend upon any of the amendments to the constitution,
but arises out of the creation and establishment by the con-
stitution itself of a national government, paramount and
supreme in its sphere of action .... 95
Therefore, the tenant may have the correlative right not to
be injured for having availed himself of the basic right to report
violations of the ordinance. The interest at stake here is not only
that of the citizen in his freedom to provide information to the
authorities, but also that of the government in the free and un-
impeded access to such information. Intimidation of the sources
of information would injure the interest of the government in
the effective enforcement of the laws. In addition, housing
codes were enacted primarily to protect citizens from unsafe,
unsanitary conditions. To permit landlords to evict tenants who
avail themselves of the remedies provided in these codes frus-
trates this public policy.9 6
When the landlord gives notice to terminate the tenancy in
order to punish the tenant, the situation is difficult. Although
various grounds have been suggested here for defending against
a retaliatory eviction, the problem of proving that notice has
been given in 'etaliation would appear to be insurmountable
once the landlord learns to give it without divulging the reason.
The only real solution is legislative amendment of the summary
possession statutes which would provide for a presumption of
retaliation when eviction follows a complaint to the housing
office by the tenant. This should give the tenant more assurance
of permanency.
94. COLUmBiA, S. C., CoDE § 7-35 (1957).
95. In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 536 (1895) ; accord. Motes v. United States,
178 U.S. 458 (1900).
96. See Habib v. Edwards, Civ. No. LT 75895-65, D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess.,
Landlord and Tenant Branch (Oct. 28, 1965).
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VII. CoNcLusioN
Slum housing conditions demand public interest and concern.
Adequate housing for the indigent tenant depends upon the
maintenance of the leased premises in a habitable state, or at
least in a condition that meets housing code requirements, at the
time of letting and throughout the term. Solutions to this
problem within the present framework of the law have been
suggested here. In addition, certain administrative reforms, not
discussed in this paper, would certainly facilitate more vigorous
enforcement of housing regulations. However, the only adequate
method of properly balancing the rights of landlord and tenant
so as to provide the indigent tenant with rights of action securing
the interests set forth here is statutory reformation of the
landlord-tenant framework. It is sincerely hoped that such
reform will be forthcoming.
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